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Abstract 
 
The discourse on poor state performers has suffered from widely varying definitions on what 
distinguishes certain weak states from others.  Indices that rank states from strong to weak 
conceal important distinctions that can adversely affect intervention policy. This deficiency is 
addressed by grouping states according to their performance on three dimensions of stateness: 
authority, legitimacy, and capacity. The resultant categorization identifies brittle states that are 
susceptible to regime change, impoverished states often considered as aid darlings, and fragile 
states that experience disproportionately high levels of violent internal conflict. It also provides a 
quantifiable means to analyze transitions from one state type to another for more insightful 
intervention policy. 
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Introduction 
 
In response to calls for nuanced and context driven assessments of Poor State Performers 
(PSPs),1 this paper seeks to overcome a key deficiency of single ranked indices. One-size-fits-all 
ranking systems lack clarity and create confusion. As Faust et al. (2013:7) noted, what is needed 
is a bridge between single score rankings “and the anarchic picture emerging when every country 
context is considered as qualitatively different.” That such approaches are possible has recently 
been demonstrated in formal modelling (Besley and Persson 2011) and through data-driven 
clustering (Carment et al. 2009, Grävingholt et al. 2012, Tikuisis et al. 2013, Ferreira 2015). This 
paper has two interrelated objectives. The primary objective is to present a quantifiable 
methodology of categorizing states with shared characteristics for more insightful intervention 
policy. A secondary objective is to apply this methodology for analyzing state trajectories from 
one state type to another to help identify drivers of change.   
 
The latter objective recognizes the need for greater specificity in identifying state trajectories for 
the purpose of crisis early intervention policies (O’Brien 2010).  Crisis decision support tools 
should provide generalizable crisis antecedents, i.e., identifying both the causal mechanisms 
driving the crisis and the likelihood that the crisis can be avoided given specific policy responses 
(Carment and Harvey 2000). This represents a significant departure from single rank indices that 
simply rank states on a scale from strength to weakness.  In other words, the vector of change 
(direction and speed) that we examine involves non-linear shifts from one state type to another.  
 
We meet these objectives by building on the concept of state typologies (Tikuisis et al. 2015), 
which identifies states as highly functional, moderately functional, impoverished, brittle, 
struggling, or fragile, in two ways. We first address missing indicator data by using different data 
that do not require imputation and second we apply cluster analysis for identifying statistically 
significant demarcations of certain state types to guide the grouping criteria for state 
categorization more objectively. 
 
                                                 
1The term Poor State Performance is adapted from the work of Gutiérrez-Sanín et al. (2011). 
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Our results are both novel and surprising. Far from being a reiteration of single rank indices, the 
model developed in this paper is typological differentiating among types of PSPs in a large 
comparative framework to understand the conditions under which specific types of states are 
likely to improve or deteriorate over time. In terms of the surprising elements of our findings, 
state weakness appears less as a transitory phenomenon and more as a chronic one featuring 
limited mobility (i.e., essentially stagnation or oscillation between states of weak categorization) 
for those countries characterized as impoverished, brittle, struggling, or fragile. We also find that 
of the transitions that do occur, most are dominated by changes in state legitimacy.   
 
Fragile states are confirmed to be prone to intrastate conflict (e.g., Hegre and Sambanis 2006), 
which lends credibility to the model’s discrimination of other types of weak states, not all of 
which are prone to conflict. For example, there is a tendency for aid donors to favour states that 
are weak in capacity but functional in policies and institutions, and largely free of violent 
conflict.  Hence, we additionally examine the relationship between aid allocation and state type, 
confirming a donor bias towards states weak in capacity, but bolstered by moderate levels of 
authority and legitimacy. Such discrimination is not evident with single ranked indices. We close 
with recommendations on further developments to operationalize these categorizations for future 
state assessments and intervention policy guidance. 
 
Literature Review 
 
A recent article by Mazarr (2014) argued that the concept of state failure was no longer useful to 
policy makers since the so-called Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) was over and the results 
from comprehensive interventions in failed states over the last decade were unsatisfactory. The 
notion of using categories of PSPs based on a ranking from failed to not failed essentially 
evolved from about 1994 when the US State Department initiated its comprehensive Political 
Instability Task Force.2  However, it was the GWOT that catapulted the idea of a single ranked 
index of country performance onto the policy stage with the introduction of the Fund for Peace 
                                                 
2 See http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/political-instability-task-force-home/  (PITF is no longer active). 
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‘Failed States Index’ (FFP FSI) in 2005.3 The FSI ranks states according to a vast array of 
indicators and events associated with shifting stakeholder agendas. Almost exclusively, those 
states that ranked high as failed states were those experiencing, emerging from, or entering into 
large-scale conflict.4 
 
Further justification for single ranking of PSPs was provided by the World Bank using its LICUS 
(Low Income Countries Under Stress) and CPIA (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment) 
frameworks.  Both showed that very weak states could be the crucible for terrorist activities and 
vectors for the transmission of transnational conflict, crime, disease, and environmental 
instability5. While single rankings of PSPs might still resonate from a policy perspective, they 
are not without their critics (Faust et al. 2013). Such rankings have little forecasting value, 
basically confirming what policy makers already know.  It is also very difficult to derive 
meaningful policy implications from a single rank index. Recently, Third World Quarterly 
devoted an entire issuing questioning the utility of country rankings because of their overly 
simplistic and unhelpful portrait of donor recipient country problems (see Grimm et al. 2014). 
This criticism is echoed by Pritchett et al. (2012) who show that PSPs emulate the institutions 
and development processes that donors require of them in a form of isomorphic mimicry. 
 
In a more detailed assessment, Baliamoune-Lutz and McGillivray (2008:2) described the World 
Banks’s subjective CPIA ranking as “fuzzy” since it does not provide a “crisp, clean and 
unambiguous” score that can be “compared with terribly high degree of precision”. This view is 
reinforced by Faust et al. (2013) who argue that many of the findings developed by Collier et al. 
(2003) and others using World Bank rankings are indefensible upon closer scrutiny. In response 
to these criticisms, calls for a more nuanced context-driven approach to address these ranking 
                                                 
3 Now called the Fragile States Index (Fund for Peace 2014). DOI: 
http://www.ffp.statesindex.org/rankings 
4 More restrictive classifications use the Millennium Development Goals or combine these with a 
governance index. For example, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
uses a fragility index to identify countries that lack political commitment and insufficient capacity to 
develop and implement development policies. 
5 E.g., see the policy of the US Government (2002) The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America. The White House: Washington, D.C. DOI: http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html. 
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deficiencies have been made by Carment et al. (2009), Gravingholt et al. (2012), and de Cilliers 
and Sisk (2013). 
 
But it is the FFP FSI that has been the focus of the most pointed and detailed criticism. For 
example, Gutiérrez-Sanín (2009) and Gutiérrez-Sanín et al. (2011) demonstrate that the lack of 
formal definitions and operational variance of the FSI generate significant gaps between it and 
other indices.  Coggins (2014) also asserted that the FSI uses categories that remain undefined, 
that its indicators are not transparent, and that the ranking of certain states defies logic. In their 
critique of the FSI, Beehner and Young (2012:3) argue that states cannot be easily placed along a 
spectrum from failed to not failed, “Indeed, there is a conspicuous lack of semantic agreement, 
both within the scholarly and policy communities, over how to define or differentiate a failed 
from a failing or a fragile state.”  Moreover, “The consequence of such agglomeration of diverse 
criteria is to throw a monolithic cloak over disparate problems that require tailored solutions” as 
noted by Call (2008:1495).  
 
To be sure, the FSI is not the only attempt at index construction that lacks precision.  In a much 
earlier study capturing the diversity of failed state environments, Gros (1996) created a 
taxonomy of five different failed state types: chaotic, phantom, anaemic, captured, and aborted. 
These various types derive their dysfunction from different sources, both internal and external, 
and consequently require different policy prescriptions.  In a compilation work drawing on 
disparate research agendas, Rotberg (2004) derived a slightly less negative ranking that includes 
fragile, weak, failing, failed, collapsed, and recovering states.  However, neither of these 
taxonomies, drawn mostly from case-based evidence, represents an effort to construct mutually 
exclusive categories quantitatively nor do they provide a clear demarcation or break point that 
unambiguously separates categories of state functions from one another. 
 
The policy implications of using a single ranking of PSPs such as the FSI are significant. As 
observed by Bakrania and Lucas (2009), Chauvet et al. (2011), Faust et al. (2013), and 
Brinkerhoff (2014), conceptual ambiguity makes it more difficult to derive effective responses. 
This includes repairing deteriorated situations, dealing with regional spillover effects, and 
helping to create a long term policy environment in which poverty reduction, property rights, and 
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good governance can become feasible.6 Apart from the need to better understand the type and 
amount of resources to allocate at any given time and place, donors also need to understand the 
likely consequences of such allocation in advance. 
 
In brief, ambiguity on differentiating certain weak states from others makes it difficult to focus 
on priority problems and to prescribe suitable interventions.7 Indeed, applying a tailored 
approach better suited to decision making beyond just a single ranking of performance is a key 
requirement of PSP analysis advocated by several investigators (Blair et al. 2014, Goldstone 
2009, Furness 2014, Brinkerhoff 2014, Marshall and Cole 2014), all of whom have argued 
against single rank indices. 
 
To address this perceived deficiency, we use draw on the Country Indicators for Foreign Policy 
(CIFP; 2014) fragile states framework that characterizes states along three dimensions of 
stateness, specifically authority (A), legitimacy (L), and capacity (C).8 These dimensions closely 
follow the recognition of combined statehood qualities (Nettl 1968) that are frequently implied, 
as for example by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) “State-building rests on three 
pillars: the capacity of state structures to perform core functions; their legitimacy and 
accountability; and ability to provide an enabling environment for strong economic performance 
to generate incomes, employment and domestic revenues.”9   
 
The State Typology Model was recently introduced (Tikuisis et al. 2015) for a more unpacked 
categorization of states. Specifically, it was developed to identify states characterized as highly 
functional, moderately functional, impoverished, brittle, struggling, or fragile. For example, 
while impoverished states are hampered by low capacity, they are reinforced with moderate 
                                                 
6 Also see Andrimihaja et al. (2011) and Pritchett et al. (2012). 
7 E.g., the FSI’s categorization of weak states under labels of alert and warning still begs the type of 
intervention that might be required to assist such states most effectively. 
8 See Carment et al. (2006, 2009) and www.carleton.ca/cifp for detailed characterization and development 
of the A-L-C concept. 
9 See Piloting the Principles for Good Engagement in Fragile States. OECD DAC Fragile States Concept 
Note, 17 June 2005 (p 8). DOI: 
http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DCD(2005)11/REV1&docLang
uage=En. 
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authority and legitimacy. Brittle states exhibit moderate authority and moderate to high capacity, 
but weak legitimacy. Fragile states are the polar opposite of highly functional states and stand 
out as highly susceptible to violent internal conflict. What the state typologies concept provided 
in its original form was a more nuanced, context specific, and quantifiable methodology for 
categorizing PSPs along the A-L-C dimensions.  Herein, we improve upon the categorization of 
states using a more complete dataset and statistical clustering. 
 
Data and Analysis 
 
World Bank indicator data10 were used exclusively for this study given their level of 
comprehensiveness, completeness, and availability.  The number of indicators sought was also 
limited in adherence with the rationale of a minimalist construct (Briguglio 2003, Ferreira 2015, 
Lambach et al. 2015, Tikuisis et al. 2015); that is, fewer indicators lessen the potential ambiguity 
associated with identifying causal relationships between the indicators and changes in state 
status. The World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), of which there are six, were 
used to gauge the authority and legitimacy dimensions of stateness,11 and World Bank GDP data 
were used to gauge state capacity. 
 
Borrowing from the original definitions (Carment et al. 2009, Tikuisis et al. 2015), state 
authority reflects the institutional ability to enact binding legislation over its population and to 
provide it with a stable and secure environment. Four WGI were selected to represent authority: 
Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Rule of Law, 
and Regulatory Quality (definitions are provided in the online Appendix A). The estimate for 
each aggregate indicator provides the state's score in units of a standard normal distribution, i.e. 
ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong). We apply an unweighted average of the 
four scores to represent the raw value of state authority. 
 
                                                 
10 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home  
11 The WGI have been criticized as essentially measuring the same broad concept (Langbein and Knack 
2010), yet this has been countered as a flawed analysis of causality and correlation (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi 2010). 
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State legitimacy reflects leadership support of the population along with international 
recognition of that support. Two WGI were selected to represent legitimacy: Control of 
Corruption, and Voice and Accountability (see online Appendix A). The estimates for these 
aggregate indicators were scored and averaged similarly to the indicators of state authority. 
 
State capacity is often judged by a multitude of attributes from a state’s military and economic 
strength to its human development capability. Using a multivariate approach, Hendrix (2010) 
concluded that state capacity can be essentially captured by bureaucratic quality and tax 
compliance.  Yet, these measures largely encompass elements of state authority.  Instead, we 
seek an alternative measure of capacity that reflects the state’s resources that can be mobilized 
for productive and defensive purposes. As a lead indicator of the productivity of a state, GDP can 
serve as an economic proxy for state capacity since the state relies, in large part, on its 
productivity to resource its capacity.  In essence, capacity in our model represents economic 
resourcefulness. 
 
The challenge, however, is that while a large GDP might reflect a state’s capacity to trade 
globally and to secure itself from external threats (e.g., sovereignty protection), it might over 
represent its internal capacity to adequately service its population (e.g., provision of health and 
education).  Since per capita GDP can proxy such a measure,12 it is proposed that overall state 
capacity can be reasonably represented by a combination of GDP and GDPpc (see online 
Appendix A for definitions). Both measures were log-transformed on the basis that purchasing 
parity/power does not increase proportionally with increased size,13 which results in a more 
balanced representation of state wealth. The log-transformed values were then averaged without 
bias to represent the raw score of state capacity.14 
 
Complete data for the above indicators were available for 178 countries from 2002 to 2013 
inclusive.  All raw scores within an A-L-C dimension were normalized according to the min-max 
                                                 
12 For example, China ranked 3rd in 2012 GDP but only 97th in GDPpc in contrast to Singapore that 
ranked 38th in GDP but 21st in GDPpc. 
13 Log-transformation is similarly applied to the income component of the UN Human Development 
Index. DOI: https://data.undp.org/dataset/Table-2-Human-Development-Index-trends/efc4-gjvq. 
14 E.g., this resulted in China and Singapore ranking 15th and 24th, respectively, in 2012 (the US was 1st). 
10 
 
range across all states and all years on a scale from 1 (best) to 9 (worst).  These normalized 
scores of A, L, and C were then averaged without weight to obtain the Fragility Index (FI) 
following the methodology of CIFP.8 
 
To separate the states, we first sought to identify two specific types of states introduced in 
Tikuisis et al. (2015), namely impoverished and brittle.  This departure from clustering all states 
simultaneously distinguishes our two-tiered approach from others that simply rank states from 
strong to weak.  States with moderate levels of authority and legitimacy, but challenged by weak 
capacity, are labelled as ‘Impoverished’ (I).  Using C > 6.5 as the threshold capacity value, 
twenty-eight impoverished states were identified by their average weak capacity while exhibiting 
stronger levels of authority and legitimacy. States that are weak in legitimacy, but not in 
authority and capacity, are labelled ‘Brittle’ (B) given their susceptibility to political instability, 
similar to the distinction noted by Rotberg (2004). Sixteen brittle states were identified by weak 
legitimacy (using L > 6.5) while exhibiting stronger levels of authority and capacity.   
 
We then applied cluster analysis15 with a specification of four clusters to separate the remaining 
134 states using their 12-year average values of A, L, and C. This resulted in unambiguous 
demarcations of a ‘Highly Functional’ (H) group (FI range of 1.87 to 2.93) and a ‘Fragile’ (F) 
group (FI range of 6.55 to 7.97).16  A slight overlap occurred between the other two clusters with 
FI ranges of 3.18 to 4.56 (deemed ‘Moderately Functional’ (M)) and 4.48 to 6.31 (deemed 
‘Struggling Functional’ (S)). By imposing a FI value of 4.6 to separate these two types, all states 
identified in the M group remain within that group while only two states, Brazil and Kuwait, 
move into the M group.17 The complete selection criteria are summarized in Table 1. An 
example of indicator scaling and state categorization is provided in Appendix A. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 STATISTICA® K-means Cluster. 
16 Note that although FI was not used in the clustering algorithm, it represents the average of A, L, and C 
that were used and conveniently siplifies the selection criteria.  
17 Choosing FI separation values other than 4.6 would result in a larger number of displacements. 
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Table 1. Categorization of state types and corresponding grouping criteria based on the scores of 
state authority (A), legitimacy (L), and capacity (C); note that FI represents the average of A, L, 
and C. The selection priority begins with I and B states, and if no states meet their selection 
criteria, then they are grouped according to the selection criteria for H, M, S, and F states.16 
Type A-L-C or FI Thresholds Description 
I A < 6.5 L < 6.5 C > 6.5 Impoverished state with weak capacity 
B A < 6.5 L > 6.5 C < 6.5 Brittle state with weak legitimacy  
H FI < 3 Highly functional state 
M 3 < FI < 4.6 Moderately functional state 
S 4.6 < FI < 6.5 Struggling functional state 
F 6.5 < FI Fragile state 
 
Expectations 
 
Given the distinct demarcations noted above, we expect to find the fragility index significantly 
different among the different state types except between the impoverished and brittle states. 18 
We also expect a significantly higher level of violence in fragile states than any other state type.  
The unit of measure of violent intrastate conflict used herein is based on the integrated product of 
conflict duration (yrs) and conflict intensity (nd).  We applied the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program (UCDP) conflict intensity values of 1 and 2 based on the number of annual intrastate 
conflict deaths in the respective ranges of 25 – 999 and 1000+ reported by UCDP19 (no intensity 
value is assigned for fewer than 25 deaths).  
 
The effectiveness of aid allocation is clouded by definition and various performance metrics of 
merit exacerbating an imbalance of ‘aid darlings’ and ‘aid orphans’. The evidence for the 
selectivity of aid allocation based on the strength of the recipient state’s policy and its 
institutions is weak (Clist 2011).  Aid donors tend to favour states that are weak in capacity yet 
                                                 
18  These and all other comparisons were statistically tested using one-way ANOVA with Newman-Keuls 
post-hoc significance at p < 0.05. 
19 Intrastate conflict is coded as Type 3 “internal armed conflict between the government of a state and 
one or more internal opposition group(s) without intervention from other states” by UCDP. DOI: 
http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/ucdp_battle-related_deaths_dataset/. 
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exhibit functional policies and institutions (essentially moderate authority and legitimacy) over 
those that are deemed dysfunctional. Attempts to correct the imbalance are fraught with political 
sensitivities (Rogerson and Steensen 2009). Roughly, it is estimated that almost half of the 
allocated aid using DAC bilateral data20 is determined by donor-specific factors, one-third by 
needs, a sixth by self-interest and only 2% by performance (Hoeffler and Outram 2008).  Hence, 
it is expected that impoverished states (weak capacity, but with moderate authority and 
legitimacy) receive higher levels of ODA (Official Development Assistance)21 compared to 
fragile states that are weak in all dimensions of stateness. 
 
Findings 
 
Over the 12-year study period (2002 – 2013), slight deteriorations in the average values of A 
(from 4.92 to 4.90) and L (5.45 to 5.46) were found to be significant while a larger significant 
improvement in C (5.72 to 5.35) resulted in a modest and significant improvement in FI (from 
5.36 to 5.24).22 Overall, the numbers of states that improved in A, L, C, and FI during the 12-
year study period are 88 (49%), 92 (52%), 170 (96%), and 110 (62%), respectively.  Sixty-one 
states improved in all three dimensions of stateness while six states (Bahamas, Central African 
Republic, Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Puerto Rico) deteriorated in all three dimensions. 
 
Figure 1 displays the scatter of the average A-L-C scores from 2002 to 2013 among the 178 
states segregated according to state type. The poorest performing dimension (i.e., highest score) 
was capacity for the highly functional, moderately functional, and impoverished states, while it 
was legitimacy for the brittle, struggling functional, and fragile states. The complete list of state 
categorizations with descriptive statistics on the average A, L, C, and FI scores, as well as annual 
state status, is provided in the online Appendix B.  
 
 
                                                 
20 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline.htm.   
21 Source: www.oecd.org/dac/stats/idsonline (last updated 22 Dec 2015 in current $US). 
22 Using linear regression with significance acceptance at p < 0.05. 
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Figure 1. Scatterplot of the average A (authority), L (legitimacy), and C (capacity) scores of all 
178 states allocated in their respective categorizations (H = highly functional, M = moderately 
functional, I = impoverished, B = brittle, S = struggling functional, F = fragile). 
 
Twenty-two states from Australia to the United States fulfilled the criteria for highly functional 
status.  Thirty-five states were allocated under moderately functional status.  Twenty-eight 
impoverished states were identified that include, for example, Belize, Maldives, and Zambia. 
Three brittle states, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia are distinguished by their relatively strong 
capacity compared to thirteen other brittle states that exhibit moderate capacity. The range of the 
36 struggling functional states is diverse from relatively strong members that include Mexico, 
Oman, and Turkey to relatively weak members that include Algeria, Armenia, and Venezuela. 
Finally, the list of 41 fragile states shown in Table 2 ranges from less weak members such as 
Bangladesh, Nigeria, and Papua New Guinea to quite weak members such as Afghanistan, 
Central African Republic, and Zimbabwe. 
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Table 2. Categorization of Fragile States 
 
Overall state status based on the average A, L, C, and FI scores from 2002 through 2013 
inclusive, annual state status (for blank fields, refer to previous year), years of intrastate conflict 
and integrated score (Sc) of conflict intensity x duration, and 12-year average net Official 
Development Assistance received per capita.  (I = impoverished, B = brittle, S = struggling 
functional, F = fragile) 
State 
Average Status Annual Status by Year Conflict Net 
ODApc A L C FI 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 Yrs Sc 
Afghanistan 8.41 8.22 7.28 7.97 F            1 1 166.9 
Bangladesh 6.84 7.01 5.82 6.56 F      S      2 2 10.6 
Burundi 7.49 7.41 8.57 7.82 F            6 7 51.5 
Cambodia 6.30 7.43 7.04 6.92 F              47.1 
Central African Rep. 7.80 7.57 8.10 7.83 F            4 4 40.4 
Chad 7.50 8.00 7.01 7.50 F            8 9 35.3 
Comoros 7.11 6.62 8.45 7.39 F              68.2 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 8.29 8.25 7.16 7.90 F            4 4 44.3 
Congo, Rep. 7.07 7.53 6.47 7.02 F              102.6 
Cote d'Ivoire 7.35 7.60 6.30 7.08 F            4 4 48.6 
Djibouti 6.06 6.99 7.84 6.96 F              145.1 
Equatorial Guinea 6.95 8.75 5.38 7.03 F              44.0 
Ethiopia 6.78 7.29 7.15 7.08 F            12 12 33.1 
Gambia, The 5.45 6.92 8.33 6.90 I  F            60.9 
Guinea 7.39 7.60 7.76 7.58 F              25.6 
Guinea-Bissau 7.00 7.40 8.40 7.60 F              68.2 
Haiti 7.49 7.68 7.34 7.50 F            1 1 100.6 
Iraq 8.25 8.12 5.35 7.24 F            2 3 191.8 
Kyrgyz Republic 6.46 7.38 7.54 7.12 F              64.1 
Lao PDR 6.51 8.23 7.42 7.38 F              61.8 
Liberia 7.38 6.72 8.74 7.61 F            2 3 151.7 
Libya 6.65 8.16 4.83 6.55 F B        F   1 2 15.1 
Mauritania 6.04 6.79 7.41 6.75 I  F          1 1 95.4 
Nepal 6.80 6.77 7.16 6.91 F            5 9 24.4 
Niger 6.16 6.54 7.71 6.80 F  I  F     I  F 2 2 39.5 
Nigeria 7.37 7.27 5.37 6.67 F      S F     3 3 17.9 
Pakistan 7.01 7.32 5.49 6.61 F    S F       8 15 13.2 
Papua New Guinea 6.38 6.58 6.92 6.62 I F        I     60.8 
Rwanda 5.84 6.66 7.70 6.73 F        I    1 1 79.2 
Sierra Leone 6.64 6.64 7.92 7.07 F        I  F    76.8 
Sudan 7.94 8.40 6.14 7.50 F            11 17 37.0 
Swaziland 5.89 7.00 6.78 6.56 F      S   F  S   55.3 
Tajikistan 7.04 7.78 7.72 7.51 F            2 2 40.9 
Timor-Leste 6.82 6.13 8.26 7.07 F  I F           229.0 
Togo 6.65 7.49 7.78 7.31 F              37.4 
Turkmenistan 7.27 8.84 6.15 7.42 F              7.5 
Uganda 5.96 6.82 7.03 6.60 F         S F  5 7 47.6 
Uzbekistan 7.33 8.48 6.51 7.44 F            1 1 7.5 
15 
 
West Bank / Gaza23 6.68 7.04 6.79 6.84 F        I F   12 12 515.7 
Yemen, Rep. 7.23 7.56 6.42 7.07 F              20.4 
Zimbabwe 7.88 8.21 7.27 7.79 F              38.8 
min 5.45 6.13 4.83 6.55             0 0 7.5 
max 8.41 8.84 8.74 7.97             12 17 515.7 
average 6.96 7.44 7.09 7.17             2.4 3.0 73.7 
 
As expected, all state types differ in their average fragility indices significantly from one another 
(highly functional (2.3), moderately functional (3.9), struggling functional (5.5), fragile (7.2)) 
except between impoverished (5.9) and brittle (6.1) states (Figure 2), which are henceforth not 
judged weaker or stronger from one another. 
 
The average integrated duration x intensity of violent intrastate conflict of fragile states (3.0) 
significantly exceeds all other state types except struggling functional states (similar average of 
3.0; Figure 2). Thus, the expectation that fragile states are significantly more prone to intrastate 
violence than all other state types is mostly confirmed, specifically compared to H, M, I, and B 
states. It is noteworthy that a majority of fragile states (56.1%) experienced conflict at some time 
during 2002 – 2013 compared to about a third of the struggling functional states (30.6%) 
indicating a generally higher severity in the latter affected states. 
 
The average per capita ODA of impoverished states (155.0) significantly exceeds all other state 
types (Figure 2). Indeed, impoverished states with weak capacity and moderate levels of 
authority and legitimacy received more than twice the aid of the more violent-prone fragile states 
(average of 73.7).  
 
                                                 
23 Conflict statistics are reported by UCDP under Israel, but assigned in this study to West Bank and 
Gaza. 
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Figure 2.  Mean (± 95% confidence interval) fragility index (FI), integrated duration x intensity 
of violent intrastate conflict (Conflict), and per capita ODA shown for each state type (H = 
highly functional, M = moderately functional, I = impoverished, B = brittle, S = struggling 
functional, F = fragile). 
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Overall, 122 transitions were observed among 17 different pathways among 56 states, 
representing almost a third of the 178 states studied.  The majority of transitions (92%) occurred 
between B and S status (29%), I and F status (20%), S and I status (14%), M and S status (11%), 
B and F status (9%), and S and F status (9%).  There were no transitions between M status with 
either B or F status.  However, not all transitions led to an improvement or deterioration in state 
status between 2002 and 2013.  We consider improvements or deteriorations to include any 
transition that shifts a state’s status from one type to another with a respective significant 
decrease or increase in FI.24  Of the 56 states that exhibited transitions, 21 improved and 13 
deteriorated within the period of study representing almost 19% of the 178 states analyzed.25   
An important policy question concerning these transitions is to identify the state dimension most 
responsible for an improvement or deterioration.     
 
All transitions of the 34 states that improved or deteriorated were examined to determine the 
dimension(s) that led the transition.  Figure 3 provides a number of examples.  For instance, a 
decrease in L led to the transition of Moldova out of fragility to impoverished status in 2006; a 
decrease in C led to the transition of Belarus out of fragility to brittle status between 2003 and 
2012; and decreases in A, L, and C led to the transition of Zambia out of fragility to struggling 
status between 2003 and 2011.  Regarding deteriorations, an increase in L led to the transition of 
Kuwait out of moderately functional to struggling status in 2011; an increase in A led to the 
transition of Portugal out of highly functional to moderately functional status in 2005; and 
increases in A and L led to the transition of Madagascar out of impoverished to fragility status in 
2010.  Belarus and Zambia also display oscillations in state status owing to minor fluctuations in 
state dimensions, primarily A and L. 
 
 
                                                 
24  This excludes transitions between I and B status given that no statistical difference in their FI was 
found between these two state types. 
25  21 states transitioned back to their initial status while one state, Nicaragua, transitioned from I to S 
status in 2008, and then to B status in 2013 (see above footnote). 
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  Figure 3.  Plots of authority (A), legitimacy (L), and capacity (C) for various states against year 
showing examples of transitions in state status (H = highly functional; M = moderately 
functional; I = impoverished; B = brittle; S = struggling functional; F = fragile) denoted by ▲. 
The arrows adjacent to A, L, and C indicate a significant change over the 14 year period from 
2002 to 2013.  States that improved are shown on the left-hand side of the figure and those that 
deteriorated are shown on the right-hand side.   
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In total, the number of occasions that changes in A, L, and C were responsible for the 21 
transitions of state improvement were 11, 15, and 14, respectively.  However, changes in A were 
always coupled with another dimension while changes in L and C were solely involved for 5 and 
4 transitions, respectively.  In contrast, C was not responsible for any transition of state 
deterioration.  Of the 13 deteriorations, one involved a change in A alone, five involved a change 
in L alone, and the remaining seven involved changes in both A and L.  In summary, changes in 
A, L, and C were responsible for 56, 79, and 41% of all transitions leading either to an 
improvement or deterioration in state status, thus underlining the dominant role of L.  All 
transitions can be inspected in Appendix B. 
 
As noted earlier, the FFP FSI3 is widely cited but often criticized because its categorization of a 
state does not provide sufficient explanatory power for informed intervention policy. We 
conducted a comparison between the FSI scores against the fragility indices and state 
categorizations of the present model to explore similarities and differences between the two 
methodologies. The FI values for 2012 were compared to the FSI values reported in 2013, also 
comprising 178 states, which reflect state condition in 2012.  Considerable disparity occurred 
among the weaker states. For instance, Georgia, Comoros, and Colombia were ranked 55th, 56th, 
and 57th by FSI (respective scores of 84.2, 84.0, and 83.8).26 The state categorization of our 
model ranks Comoros 12th (F status), which is notably worse than the other two states (Georgia 
99th and Colombia 101st, both as S status). Table 3 provides several additional pairings that also 
highlight the wide disparity in rank and status between states identified by our model in contrast 
to the nearly indistinguishable assessment by FSI.27 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26 FSI rank denotes worse to best in ascending order based on a scale from 0 (best) to 120 (worst). 
27  In addition, it is quite peculiar that Belgium, France, Japan, Singapore, United Kingdom, and United 
States were all classified by FSI as ‘Stable’, which is one level below ‘Sustainable’, whereas these states 
are more reasonably classified at the highest level of state functionality (H) by our model. 
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Table 3. Comparison of state status between FSI and FI of the current state categorization model.  
Rank indicates worst to best in ascending order.  FSI ranges from 0 to 120 (best to worst) and FI 
ranges from 1 to 9 (best to worst) (M = moderately functional, I = impoverished, B = brittle, S = 
struggling functional, F = fragile). 
State FSI 2013 FI 2012 
Rank Index Label Rank Index Type 
Russia 
Turkmenistan 
80th 
81st 
77.1 
76.7 
Warning 86th 
16th 
5.59 
7.24 
B 
F 
Guyana 
Namibia 
107th 
108th 
70.8 
70.4 
Warning 46th 
114th 
6.45 
4.91 
I 
S 
Belize 
Cyprus 
114th 
115th 
67.2 
67.0 
Warning 83rd 
150th 
5.62 
3.51 
I 
M 
Mexico 
Vietnam 
97th 
97th 
73.1 
73.1 
Warning 119th 
64th 
4.65 
6.10 
S 
B 
 
With a focus on the weaker states, we also compare the identification of the World Bank CPIA 
states with the current model assessment. CPIA assessment is based on clusters of indicators 
pertaining to economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion, and public 
sector management and institutions.28 Low CPIA scores are used to generate the Harmonized 
List of Fragile Situations.  Of the 178 states that we analyzed, 22 were common to the 2013 
CPIA list.  And of these, our model categorized twenty as fragile, and one each as struggling 
functional (Bosnia and Herzegovina) and impoverished (Solomon Islands), thus demonstrating 
high consistency between the two methods of weak state categorization.  
 
Discussion 
 
The state categorization model developed herein offers a more refined quantifiable methodology 
than previously introduced for categorizing states along three dimensions of stateness: authority, 
legitimacy, and capacity. While we acknowledge that good qualitative and historical analysis is a 
                                                 
28 See http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/Fragilityandconflict/ 
FragileSituations_Information%20Note.pdf. 
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strong contender to modelling (Gutiérrez-Sanín 2009), the analytical-descriptive value of our 
approach offers the potential to complement such analyses and to enable better descriptions of 
the various manifestations of state strength that ultimately might contribute to better and more 
adapted interventions. The parsimonious approach in the number of indicators used also 
facilitates identifying causal relationships with changes in state status. 
  
The general findings and geographical distribution of states according to type concurs with 
expectation.29  For example, the majority of fragile states are found in Africa (see Table 2).  The 
finding of an overall improvement from 2002 to 2013 owing to a decrease in the average fragility 
index of all 178 states studied herein is also consistent with a broad consensus of global 
improvement, at least through the end of 2012 (e.g., Evans 2012, Arbour 2012, Marshall and 
Cole 2014, Tikuisis and Mandel 2015).   
 
The categorization schema can be applied for any state including those not analyzed herein as 
data become available whether for the years already analyzed or beyond 2013 (a demonstration 
is provided in Appendix A). Such categorization allows us to not only discriminate the types of 
weaknesses and strengths involved, but to also analyze state trajectories from positions of 
weakness to strength, and vice-versa.  This construct circumvents a major criticism of single rank 
indices such as the FSI that simply place all states along a spectrum of fragility. While our model 
also furnishes a single rank index (i.e., FI), the distinguishing feature of our two-tier approach 
lies in its initial identification of impoverished and brittle states.  Although subsequent 
categorization is based on FI, this is a simplified and convenient consequence of the statistical 
clustering of the A, L, and C values.  The end result is quite sound given that the differences 
between H and M states, and between S and F states is in the degree vs. kind of their strengths 
and weaknesses, respectively. 
 
An instructive example of the diversity that this state categorization offers for a more informed 
target intervention is demonstrated by the assessments of Maldives, Egypt, and Guatemala with 
similar respective average fragility indices of 6.04, 6.02, and 6.04 (see online Appendix B).  
                                                 
29 E.g., Fragile States 2013: Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World. OECD DAC International 
Network on Conflict and Fragility Report. DOI: http://oecd-library.org.  
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These states, however, were respectively categorized overall as impoverished, brittle, and 
struggling functional status owing to their very different average A, L, and C scores.  Without 
such discrimination as noted earlier by Faust (2013), these states might be viewed similarly using 
linear indexing and in equal need of non-differentiated assistance. 
 
The susceptibility of fragile states to violent internal conflict compared to more stable states has 
been upheld by the present analysis.  Additionally, the level of conflict in struggling functional 
states was not found to differ significantly from fragile states, although only about a third of the 
S states versus more than half of the F states experienced conflict.30  This finding is congruent 
with the recent prediction of states most at risk of state-led mass killings in which 24 of the 26 
states in common with those we analyzed are categorized as either struggling functional (6 cases) 
or fragile (18 cases) for 2013.31   
 
Closer inspection of the level of internal conflict in the struggling functional states indicates that 
certain of these states with moderately strong capacity (C < 5) average almost six times the 
integrated conflict intensity (6.1) compared to the other S states (1.1) with weaker capacity (see 
online Appendix B). This striking difference highlights the seemingly ineffectiveness of the 
stronger economic capacity of states such as Turkey, India, Thailand, Colombia, and Algeria to 
stem their internal violent conflict.  In other words, it appears that economic capacity has limited 
leverage with regard to state security, at least in these and certain fragile states such as Libya, 
Iraq, Nigeria, and Pakistan with average capacity values of less than 5.5 that collectively32 have a 
67% higher conflict intensity (4.6) than all other F states (2.8) with weaker capacity. This is 
consistent with the emerging phenomenon of MIFF states (middle-income but failed or fragile; 
Economist 2011) where rising incomes do not necessarily ensure increased stability (Chandy and 
Gertz 2011).  In particular, Nigeria and Pakistan were singled out by the Economist (2011) as 
prime examples of MIFF states.   
                                                 
30 The propensity of intrastate violence in these states, however, is not unexpected given that one of the 
four Worldwide Governance indicators used to define authority is the ‘Absence of Violence/Terrorism’. 
31 See Early Warning Project posted 31 Jul 2014. DOI:  
http://cpgearlywarning.wordpress.com/2014/07/31/2014-statistical-risk-assessments/.   
Malawi and Rwanda, both categorized as impoverished in 2013, were the two exceptions. 
32 This grouping includes Equatorial Guinea with an average capacity of 5.38 with no conflict. 
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Furthermore, it turns out that the legitimacy scores of these economically stronger, but more 
violent S and F states are worse than their counterparts with weaker capacity. This supports 
Hegre’s (2014:159) recent supposition that “economic development is unlikely to bring about 
lasting peace alone, without the formalization embedded in democratic institutions” and that of 
Walter (2015) and Krueger and Laitin (2008) who advocate that increased accountability to the 
governed population is a more effective means of eliminating violence than increasing economic 
status. 
 
The majority of the 34 state transitions from either deterioration to improvement or vice-versa 
were dominated by changes in legitimacy. Legitimacy also worsened, slightly but significantly 
over time, which is consistent with the recent supposition that political and civil liberties have 
deteriorated globally over the last several years (Glenn et al. 2015).  This should warrant some 
concern given that weak legitimacy is the Achilles heel of brittle states.  It is noteworthy that 
Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia, categorized as brittle states prior to 2011 (see online Appendix B), 
succumbed to regime-changing uprisings during the Arab Spring in 2011, while Saudi Arabia, 
also categorized as brittle but with a high capacity, successfully appeased its population through 
financial means.33 Legitimacy is also highlighted as a target of concern in states with insurgency 
challenges; to effect positive change, it is necessary to improve the state’s “commitment and 
motivation and to increase legitimacy” (Paul et al. 2013:xxix).  Indeed, Andrimihaja et al. (2011) 
argue that most fragile states should be treated differently from those with better policy 
structures with aid focused on reducing corruption.  
 
This was exercised in 2013 when US$16B of development assistance to Afghanistan by donor 
nations was conditional on fair elections in 2014 (Norland 2014), which turned out less than 
satisfactory and prolonged an uncertain future.34 Kaplan (2009) suggested that weakness in 
                                                 
33 The increased domestic expenditure (e.g., social services) by Saudi Arabia has been dubbed the 
“national bribe” (e.g., see Lesch 2012:145). 
34 Human Rights Watch “Today We Shall All Die” (Mar 2015) re-affirmed that “Widespread, rampant 
corruption [in Afghanistan] has contributed to human rights abuses and impunity.” and that “This grand 
corruption is extremely damaging to state-building efforts …”. DOI:  
http://www.hrw.org/news/2015/03/03/afghanistan-abusive-strongmen-escape-justice. 
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social cohesion and institutions are barriers to typical interventionist solutions such as 
competitive elections. Kaplan (p 74) further concluded that “States cannot be made to work from 
the outside” and that “The key to fixing fragile states is to deeply enmesh government within 
society”.  In other words, political versus technocratic reforms is required to achieve change in 
state weakness (Wesley 2008).  This can only be realized with legitimacy through mutual trust. 
Yet, while legitimacy might be recognized as the key to reducing violence (Hegre 2014; Walter 
2015) and to improving the status of a brittle, struggling functional, or fragile state as our 
analysis suggests, such a transition might be trumped by intransigent political self-interest (e.g., 
Traub 2011). 
 
From a policy perspective, this study applied longitudinal data to assess the trajectories of 
different state types using a hybrid of data-driven and concept-driven approaches.  Caught in a 
low level equilibrium, many weak states appear to be trapped in perpetual political and economic 
limbo, as portrayed by the turnover region in Bremmer’s “J-Curve” (2006).35  Such states, by 
definition, are characterized by weak policy environments, making engagement in them 
particularly challenging.  States that we identify as brittle and impoverished reside above the 
turnover region on either side of it (left and right, respectively).   
 
What our categorization of states cannot directly answer are questions such as will ODA push a 
fragile state towards impoverished status or does movement to I lead to greater ODA. Or will 
conflict push a state towards fragile status or does movement to F lead to (greater) conflict?  
Unpacking such causal relationships requires deeper analysis.  That is, if the goal of policy 
relevant interventions is to be fulfilled, then a crucial next step would be to identify the sub-
indicators (i.e., the components that comprise the Worldwide Governance Indicators) where 
changes are most likely to alter the possibility of deterioration or improvement for weak states 
(i.e., transitioning into or out of impoverished, brittle, struggling functional, and fragile states). 
For example, to advocate a policy response to poor legitimacy, targeting a state’s control of 
corruption, and/or voice and accountability only provides general direction; in-depth country 
analysis is required for a specific response. 
                                                 
35  The J-curve depicts the relative stability of a state as a function of openness, which relates to 
legitimacy in our model. 
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A subsequent second step would be to develop specific scenarios for each country case to 
complement a risk analysis (e.g., CIFP Fragile States Report 2014).  Scenarios would provide 
the analyst with an opportunity to determine how hypothetical variations in the ALC variables 
are likely to effect the country’s trajectory and the level of interdependence among the ALC 
dimensions within a specific country setting (‘knock on effects’). A third step would be to match 
ALC outcomes to specific policy responses in order to determine the level, kind, and duration of 
effort needed to promote positive transitions. Country profiles capturing the full range of 
potential entry points would be useful at this stage of analysis. 
 
Ideally, the drafting of such scenarios would be conducted in partnership with a specific end user 
from the policy community who would work with the research team to identify the resources 
needed to generate effective policy response.  Complementary analyses focusing on events data, 
leadership profiles, and decision making processes are also crucial components to the larger early 
intervention enterprise (Carment et al. 2009, O’Brien 2010). Such findings need to be shared and 
incorporated into a broader study to achieve the objectives of synthesis, accumulation, and 
integration – all hallmarks of a successful policy relevant research programme. 
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Appendix A: State Categorization 
 
All new case data should be gauged against the base data of the 178 states analyzed in this study 
from 2002 through 2013 inclusive.  Specifically, for scaling purposes, the minimum and 
maximum values to be applied for Authority [based on the average of raw WB World 
Governance Indicator values of Government Effectiveness (GE), Political Stability and Absence 
of Violence/Terrorism (PS), Rule of Law (RL), and Regulatory Quality (RQ)] are -2.083 and 
1.939, respectively. The minimum and maximum values for Legitimacy [based on the raw 
average of Control of Corruption (CC) and Voice and Accountability (VA)] are -1.795 and 
2.171. And the minimum and maximum values for Capacity (average of natural logarithms of 
GDP and GDPpc) are 12.55 and 20.52. 
 
Consider, for example, the 2013 WGI data for China:  GE = -0.029, PS = -0.546, RL = -0.456, 
and RQ = -0.300 for an average value of -0.333, which scales to an Authority value of 5.5236.  
CC = -0.357 and VA = -1.577 for an average value of -0.967, which scales to a Legitimacy value 
of 7.33.  GDP = 4.91e12 and GDPpc = 3619 convert to lnGDP = 29.22 and lnGDPpc = 8.19 for 
an average value of 18.71, which scales to a Capacity value of 2.81.  These scaled A-L-C values 
categorize China as Brittle (see Table 1 in main text). 
 
If new data fall outside the min-max range of the base data, then such data can still be processed.  
Hypothetically, for example, if the average GE, PS, RL, and RQ value in the above example was 
-2.20 instead of -0.321, then the scaled Authority value would be 9.23.  Although this exceeds 
the maximum scaled value of A in the data base, the categorization schema of Table 1 in the 
main text can still be applied.  
 
  
                                                 
36 Formula for scaling an A-L-C value = 9 – 8∙[value – (minimum in data base)/range in data base]; e.g., 
scaled value of A for China = 9 – 8∙[{–0.333 – (–2.083)}/{1.939 – (–2.083)}]. 
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Online Appendices 
 
Appendix A: World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators37 and GDP38 
Government Effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of 
the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies. 
 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism captures perceptions of the likelihood that 
the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. 
 
Rule of Law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by 
the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 
 
Regulatory Quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and 
implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 
 
Control of Corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the 
state by elites and private interests. 
 
Voice and Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are 
able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of 
association, and a free media 
 
                                                 
37 Accessed at: http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=worldwide-governance-
indicators#. 
38Accessed at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD. 
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GDP (constant 2005 US$) at purchaser's prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated 
assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in constant 2005 U.S. 
dollars. Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic currencies using 2000 official 
exchange rates. For a few countries where the official exchange rate does not reflect the rate 
effectively applied to actual foreign exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is 
used.39 
 
GDP per capita (constant 2005 US$) is gross domestic product divided by midyear population. 
 
  
                                                 
39  There is the possibility that GDP values become revised due to changes in a state’s assessment (DOI: 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/680284-why-do-countries-revise-their-
national-accounts). However, there are means to maintain a consistent base rate as applied herein (DOI: 
https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/114968-how-do-you-derive-your-constant-
price-series-for-t). 
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Appendix B: Table of State Categorizations 
 
Overall state status based on the average A, L, C, and FI scores from 2002 through 2013 inclusive, annual state status (for blank fields, 
refer to previous year), years of intrastate conflict and integrated score of conflict intensity x duration, and 12-year average net Official 
Development Assistance received per capita (based on current US$, as last last updated 22 Dec 2015).  (H = highly functional, M = 
moderately functional, I = impoverished, B = brittle, S = struggling functional, F = fragile). 
State Average Status Annual Status by Year Conflict Net 
ODApc H (n = 22) A L C FI 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 Yrs Score 
Australia 1.80 1.91 2.62 2.11 H               
Austria 1.69 2.11 2.98 2.26 H               
Belgium 2.29 2.55 2.90 2.58 H               
Canada 1.76 1.90 2.36 2.01 H               
Denmark 1.38 1.26 2.98 1.87 H               
Finland 1.19 1.40 3.20 1.93 H               
France 2.53 2.72 2.07 2.44 H               
Germany 2.07 2.16 1.90 2.05 H               
Hong Kong SAR, China 1.80 3.02 3.39 2.74 M H             0.2 
Iceland 1.74 1.69 4.27 2.57 H               
Ireland 1.88 2.39 3.07 2.45 H               
Japan 2.49 3.00 1.70 2.40 H               
Luxembourg 1.52 1.83 3.68 2.34 H               
Netherlands 1.69 1.66 2.55 1.97 H               
New Zealand 1.55 1.40 3.66 2.20 H               
Norway 1.61 1.63 2.73 1.99 H               
Singapore 1.46 3.26 3.49 2.73 H              0.4 
Spain 3.15 3.10 2.54 2.93 H    M  H M  H M     
Sweden 1.48 1.51 2.82 1.94 H               
Switzerland 1.53 1.65 2.66 1.94 H               
United Kingdom 2.15 2.22 1.96 2.11 H               
United States 2.38 2.71 1.06 2.05 H               
min 1.19 1.26 1.06 1.87               0.0 
max 3.15 3.26 4.27 2.93               0.4 
average 1.87 2.14 2.75 2.25               0.03 
M (n = 35)                    
Andorra 2.14 2.69 5.39 3.41 M               
Antigua and Barbuda 3.40 3.68 6.46 4.51 I   S M     I M    90.7 
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Bahamas, The 2.93 2.96 5.14 3.68 M              3.4 
Barbados 2.63 2.78 5.70 3.70 M              30.4 
Bermuda 2.73 3.01 4.76 3.50 M              0.2 
Botswana 3.49 3.89 5.62 4.33 M              76.3 
Brazil 5.03 4.96 3.44 4.48 M   S   M        2.5 
Brunei Darussalam 3.08 5.65 4.95 4.56 S       M        
Chile 2.59 2.85 4.20 3.21 M              6.3 
Costa Rica 3.91 3.86 5.34 4.37 M              10.2 
Croatia 4.03 4.82 4.63 4.50 M              27.2 
Cyprus 2.81 3.25 4.64 3.56 M              11.5 
Czech Republic 2.90 4.09 3.92 3.64 M              5.7 
Estonia 2.83 3.38 5.21 3.81 M              17.0 
Greece 3.70 4.32 3.44 3.82 M               
Hungary 3.11 3.94 4.16 3.73 M              6.0 
Israel 3.91 3.86 3.63 3.80 M              19.2 
Italy 3.70 4.12 2.23 3.35 M               
Korea, Rep. 3.26 4.23 2.75 3.42 M              1.0 
Kuwait 4.29 5.37 3.77 4.48 M         S     0.5 
Latvia 3.42 4.44 5.26 4.37 S M             13.6 
Lithuania 3.27 4.30 4.99 4.19 M              19.7 
Macao SAR, China 2.97 4.59 4.63 4.06 S M             0.2 
Malaysia 3.69 5.58 4.28 4.51 M      S  M    1 1 3.7 
Malta 2.36 3.23 5.42 3.67 M              5.4 
Mauritius 3.23 4.04 5.87 4.38 M              71.9 
Poland 3.53 4.06 3.69 3.76 M              7.8 
Portugal 2.83 3.10 3.60 3.18 H   M            
Puerto Rico 3.50 3.67 4.01 3.73 M               
Qatar 3.37 5.05 3.58 4.00 M              0.9 
Slovak Republic 3.24 4.20 4.30 3.91 M              8.7 
Slovenia 2.98 3.42 4.43 3.61 M              7.5 
South Africa 4.32 4.55 4.03 4.30 M              18.7 
United Arab Emirates 3.40 5.20 3.34 3.98 M              0.2 
Uruguay 3.76 3.24 5.33 4.11 M              8.5 
min 2.14 2.69 2.23 3.18             0 0 0.0 
max 5.03 5.65 6.46 4.56             1 1 90.7 
average 3.32 4.01 4.46 3.93             0.03 0.03 13.6 
I (28)                    
Belize 5.21 4.88 6.96 5.68 I              71.0 
Benin 5.41 5.88 7.14 6.14 I              56.5 
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Bhutan 4.51 5.36 7.51 5.79 I              157.5 
Burkina Faso 5.57 6.04 7.22 6.28 I              60.1 
Cabo Verde 4.29 3.95 7.25 5.16 I              403.6 
Dominica 3.54 3.68 7.32 4.85 I              342.1 
Ghana 4.94 5.14 6.73 5.60 I          S    58.9 
Grenada 4.20 4.08 7.01 5.10 I              227.5 
Guyana 5.77 5.82 7.64 6.41 I              183.2 
Lesotho 5.35 5.43 7.62 6.13 I              80.7 
Madagascar 5.82 6.00 7.53 6.45 I        F      33.2 
Malawi 5.53 6.30 7.86 6.56 F    I          55.9 
Maldives 4.86 6.44 6.82 6.04 I  S     I       133.1 
Mali 5.73 5.82 7.24 6.26 I          F  4 4 64.6 
Moldova 5.67 6.40 7.20 6.42 F    I          78.5 
Mongolia 5.01 5.74 7.08 5.94 I              112.0 
Mozambique 5.54 6.03 7.06 6.21 I            1 1 79.4 
Nicaragua 5.97 6.34 6.66 6.32 I      S     B   132.6 
Samoa 3.92 4.64 7.62 5.39 I              378.5 
Sao Tome and Principe 5.75 5.66 8.75 6.72 I              259.0 
Senegal 5.36 5.75 6.73 5.95 I            2 2 72.2 
Solomon Islands 6.43 5.85 8.12 6.80 F   I           427.7 
St. Lucia 3.52 3.29 6.85 4.55 I              128.1 
St. Vincent / Grenadines 3.50 3.50 7.18 4.73 I              159.4 
Suriname 5.22 5.16 6.71 5.69 I              136.4 
Tanzania 5.67 6.22 6.61 6.17 S  I      S      56.3 
Vanuatu 4.67 4.72 7.79 5.73 I              310.9 
Zambia 5.57 6.26 6.68 6.17 F S I S I     S     81.8 
min 3.50 3.29 6.61 4.55             0 0 33.17 
max 6.43 6.44 8.75 6.80             4 4 427.7 
average 5.09 5.37 7.25 5.90             0.25 0.25 155.0 
B (16)                    
Azerbaijan 6.22 7.62 5.86 6.57 F  B            24.9 
Belarus 6.48 7.69 5.28 6.49 F B F    B  S  B    9.0 
Cameroon 6.48 7.50 6.31 6.77 F B       F      43.1 
China 5.42 7.52 3.31 5.42 B            1 1 0.7 
Cuba 6.05 6.77 5.05 5.96 B              8.6 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 5.80 7.01 5.26 6.02 B           S   19.1 
Gabon 5.56 6.98 5.62 6.05 S B             41.1 
Honduras 6.03 6.59 6.35 6.32 S I B S   B        77.6 
Kazakhstan 5.63 7.46 4.90 6.00 B              14.0 
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Kenya 6.33 6.63 6.48 6.48 F I  F I B         39.0 
Lebanon 6.06 6.59 5.20 5.95 S B  S B S B        141.2 
Paraguay 6.44 6.75 6.33 6.51 F  B  F B  S    B   14.9 
Russian Federation 6.11 7.13 3.46 5.57 B            12 13 2.3 
Saudi Arabia 5.00 7.19 3.42 5.20 B              0.3 
Ukraine 5.95 6.50 5.15 5.87 B   S      B     12.1 
Vietnam 5.42 7.48 5.74 6.21 B              31.7 
min 5.00 6.50 3.31 5.20             0 0 0.3 
max 6.48 7.69 6.48 6.77             12 13 141.2 
average 5.94 7.09 5.23 6.09             0.81 0.88 30.0 
S (36)                    
Albania 5.51 6.00 6.05 5.85 S              111.3 
Algeria 6.53 6.92 4.81 6.08 S  B     S     11 11 7.5 
Argentina 5.74 5.54 4.04 5.10 S              2.6 
Armenia 5.02 6.66 6.58 6.09 S I S   B  S B  S    102.3 
Bahrain 4.17 5.92 4.84 4.98 S              19.8 
Bolivia 6.16 6.07 6.47 6.23 I     S         74.9 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 5.77 5.71 5.93 5.80 S              143.7 
Bulgaria 4.43 5.03 5.26 4.91 S              15.3 
Colombia 5.96 5.86 4.50 5.44 S            12 15 18.1 
Dominican Republic 5.63 5.97 5.17 5.59 S              14.3 
Ecuador 6.58 6.46 5.23 6.09 B S             13.0 
El Salvador 5.18 5.67 5.73 5.53 S              35.9 
Georgia 5.43 5.82 6.47 5.91 F  I   S       1 1 117.4 
Guatemala 6.20 6.30 5.63 6.04 S B S            26.2 
India 5.65 5.43 4.34 5.14 S            12 21 1.6 
Indonesia 6.17 6.30 4.64 5.70 S            4 4 4.3 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 6.84 7.45 4.37 6.22 S B  S         7 7 1.7 
Jamaica 4.99 5.32 5.80 5.37 S              22.7 
Jordan 4.70 5.89 5.92 5.50 S              154.8 
Macedonia, FYR 5.40 5.65 6.15 5.74 S              106.2 
Mexico 5.10 5.51 3.26 4.62 M   S           2.7 
Morocco 5.31 6.39 5.23 5.65 S    B S B S  B S    34.5 
Namibia 4.24 4.77 6.00 5.01 S              100.8 
Oman 3.74 6.01 4.64 4.80 M S M S           21.5 
Panama 4.71 5.18 5.38 5.09 S              9.2 
Peru 5.68 5.63 4.90 5.40 S            4 4 13.7 
Philippines 5.90 6.05 5.21 5.72 S            12 13 4.1 
Romania 4.72 5.20 4.55 4.83 S              7.8 
40 
 
Serbia 5.65 5.64 5.39 5.56 S              153.6 
Seychelles 4.62 5.00 6.44 5.35 I    S          285.1 
Sri Lanka 5.54 6.03 5.86 5.81 S            6 10 31.7 
Thailand 5.07 5.96 4.48 5.17 S            11 11 3.8 
Trinidad and Tobago 4.54 5.09 5.01 4.88 S              2.5 
Tunisia 4.75 6.30 5.31 5.45 S    B     S     49.1 
Turkey 5.02 5.56 3.58 4.72 S            12 12 17.8 
Venezuela, RB 7.38 7.24 4.30 6.31 S              2.0 
min 3.74 4.77 3.26 4.62             0 0 1.6 
max 7.38 7.45 6.58 6.31             12 21 285.1 
average 5.39 5.88 5.21 5.49             2.56 3.03 48.2 
F (41)                    
Afghanistan 8.41 8.22 7.28 7.97 F            1 1 166.9 
Bangladesh 6.84 7.01 5.82 6.56 F      S      2 2 10.6 
Burundi 7.49 7.41 8.57 7.82 F            6 7 51.5 
Cambodia 6.30 7.43 7.04 6.92 F              47.1 
Central African Republic 7.80 7.57 8.10 7.83 F            4 4 40.4 
Chad 7.50 8.00 7.01 7.50 F            8 9 35.3 
Comoros 7.11 6.62 8.45 7.39 F              68.2 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 8.29 8.25 7.16 7.90 F            4 4 44.3 
Congo, Rep. 7.07 7.53 6.47 7.02 F              102.6 
Cote d'Ivoire 7.35 7.60 6.30 7.08 F            4 4 48.6 
Djibouti 6.06 6.99 7.84 6.96 F              145.1 
Equatorial Guinea 6.95 8.75 5.38 7.03 F              44.0 
Ethiopia 6.78 7.29 7.15 7.08 F            12 12 33.1 
Gambia, The 5.45 6.92 8.33 6.90 I  F            60.9 
Guinea 7.39 7.60 7.76 7.58 F              25.6 
Guinea-Bissau 7.00 7.40 8.40 7.60 F              68.2 
Haiti 7.49 7.68 7.34 7.50 F            1 1 100.6 
Iraq 8.25 8.12 5.35 7.24 F            2 3 191.8 
Kyrgyz Republic 6.46 7.38 7.54 7.12 F              64.1 
Lao PDR 6.51 8.23 7.42 7.38 F              61.8 
Liberia 7.38 6.72 8.74 7.61 F            2 3 151.7 
Libya 6.65 8.16 4.83 6.55 F B        F   1 2 15.1 
Mauritania 6.04 6.79 7.41 6.75 I  F          1 1 95.4 
Nepal 6.80 6.77 7.16 6.91 F            5 9 24.4 
Niger 6.16 6.54 7.71 6.80 F  I  F     I  F 2 2 39.5 
Nigeria 7.37 7.27 5.37 6.67 F      S F     3 3 17.9 
Pakistan 7.01 7.32 5.49 6.61 F    S F       8 15 13.2 
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Papua New Guinea 6.38 6.58 6.92 6.62 I F        I     60.8 
Rwanda 5.84 6.66 7.70 6.73 F        I    1 1 79.2 
Sierra Leone 6.64 6.64 7.92 7.07 F        I  F    76.8 
Sudan 7.94 8.40 6.14 7.50 F            11 17 37.0 
Swaziland 5.89 7.00 6.78 6.56 F      S   F  S   55.3 
Tajikistan 7.04 7.78 7.72 7.51 F            2 2 40.9 
Timor-Leste 6.82 6.13 8.26 7.07 F  I F           229.0 
Togo 6.65 7.49 7.78 7.31 F              37.4 
Turkmenistan 7.27 8.84 6.15 7.42 F              7.5 
Uganda 5.96 6.82 7.03 6.60 F         S F  5 7 47.6 
Uzbekistan 7.33 8.48 6.51 7.44 F            1 1 7.5 
West Bank and Gaza40 6.68 7.04 6.79 6.84 F        I F   12 12 515.7 
Yemen, Rep. 7.23 7.56 6.42 7.07 F              20.4 
Zimbabwe 7.88 8.21 7.27 7.79 F              38.8 
min 5.45 6.13 4.83 6.55             0 0 7.5 
max 8.41 8.84 8.74 7.97             12 17 515.7 
average 6.96 7.44 7.09 7.17             2.39 2.98 73.7 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
40 Conflict statistics are reported by UCDP under Israel, but assigned in this study to West Bank and Gaza. 
